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I. INTRODUCTION
The locution "inextricably intertwined," an alliterative coupling of
adverb and adjective purporting to justify the introduction at a criminal trial
of evidence of crimes for which the defendant is uncharged, appears
nowhere in Magna Carta. It is unmentioned in connection with the reforms
of Edward I, or those following the restoration of the Stuarts, or those
associated with the enthronement of William and Mary. Baron Gilbert, in
his seminal work on evidence in 1726, has nothing to say about it. It is not
to be found in the evidentiary treatises of Starlde, Phillips, or Thayer. The
Federal Rules of Evidence make no express reference to it. It is a fair
summary of the history of the law of evidence to say that, until about the
year 1980, no one thought that evidence of uncharged crimes could be
rendered admissible by the simple expedient of describing it as "inextricably
intertwined" with evidence of the crime or crimes actually pleaded in the
indictment.
The past two decades have seen a jurisprudential revolution. During
that time, state and federal appellate courts having jurisdiction over criminal
litigation in Florida have authored some two hundred opinions considering
* Milton Hirsch received his B.A. in 1974 from the University of California. He
received his J.D. in 1982 from Georgetown University. The author gratefully acknowledges
the contributions made in the preparation of this article by Steven Bronis, Lynn Dannheisser,
Professor Steven Friedland, Theodore Klein, David 0. Markus, Honorable Marilyn Milian,
and Barbara Parker.
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the doctrine of "inextricably intertwined" evidence.' Most of those federal
opinions are in drug cases, and in those cases, the demised evidence is
almost always found to be admissible because "inextricably intertwined." It
is a fair summary of the history of the law of evidence to say that, since
about the year 1980, evidence of uncharged crimes can be rendered
admissible by the simple expedient of describing it as "inextricably
intertwined" with evidence of the crime or crimes actually pleaded in the
indictment.
It is difficult to view this doctrinal volte face as anything but result-
oriented jurisprudence. This powerful neoteric rule of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence-"This new-born babe an infant Hercules' "2 -
supports the admission of highly prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible
other-crimes evidence. It enables the prosecution to circumvent the
procedural obstacles set up by Rule 404(b) governing the admissibility of
1. As discussed infra Part IV, the term "inextricably intertwined" was spawned and
continues to be nurtured in Eleventh (former Fifth) Circuit narcotics cases. The doctrine is an
occasional visitor to other jurisdictions, where it may be cited in non-drug cases as well as
drug cases. See, e.g., United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (business crimes);
United States v. Shkolir, 182 F.3d 902 (2d Cir. 1999) (securities, mail, and wire fraud);
United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997) (possession of firearm by convicted
felon); United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1997) (tax crime); United States v.
Mundi, 892 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1989) (fraud and related crimes); United States v. Rodriguez-
Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1989) (business crimes). The focus of this article, however, is
on the state and federal courts having jurisdiction over Florida, in support of the thesis that the
expansion by the Eleventh Circuit of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine is best understood
as a judicial contribution to the "war on drugs."
2. EDMOND RosTAND, CYRANO DE BERGERAC 105 (Hooker transl., Bantam Books)
("Ce nouveau-ne, Madame, est un petit Hercule").
3. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
Section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, the state law congener to Rule 404(b), provides
in pertinent part:
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. -
(a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
2
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prior similar fact evidence. It prompts conviction for crimes of which an
accused may be charged and innocent, on the basis of evidence of crimes of
which the accused is uncharged but may be guilty. It facilitates prosecution
of the "war on drugs" by depriving the defendant of one of the ancient and
honorable premises of the Anglo-American system of justice: that the jury
sits in judgment on the act a man is alleged to have done, not on the life a
man is alleged to have led.4
II. THE COMMON LAW RES GESTAE RULE
Common law courts viewed uncharged crimes evidence as irrelevant
and the introduction of such evidence as unfair, the defendant having been
afforded no notice by the indictment or otherwise that such evidence would
be offered.5
The [common law] rule which requires that all evidence which is
introduced shall be relevant to the guilt or the innocence of the
accused is applied with considerable strictness in criminal
proceedings.... [The defendant] can with fairness be expected to
come into court prepared to meet the accusations contained in the
indictment only, and, on this account, all the evidence offered by
mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely
to prove bad character or propensity.
(b) 1. When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other
criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the
state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it
intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an
indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence of offenses
used for impeachment or on rebuttal.
2. When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge
the jury on limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be
considered. After the close of evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the
limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant
cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or
information.
RA. STAT. § 90.404 (2000); see discussion infra notes 27-28, 55, and 255.
4. "[A] defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the
bar." People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466,468 (N.Y. 1930).
5. H.C. UNDEm LL, A TREATIsE ON THE LAw OF CRMINAL EvIDENCE (1898) § 87, at
20001
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the prosecution should consist wholly of facts which are within the
range and scope of its allegations.
6
Apart from the inherent unfairness of obliging an accused to defend against
charges of which he has had no notice, the introduction of uncharged crimes
evidence was viewed at common law as resulting in damning prejudice.
Jurors:
[W]ill very naturally believe that a person is guilty of the crime
with which he is charged if it is proved to their satisfaction that he
has committed a similar offense, or any offense of an equally
heinous character. And, it cannot be said with truth that this
tendency is wholly without reason or justification .... 7
To the general rule, "applied with considerable strictness," that no
evidence could be offered of uncharged crimes, the common law made
certain exceptions. One such exception was a manifestation of the res
gestae rule, that many-headed hydra. When the uncharged crimes evidence
was part of the res gestae-when "several crimes are intermixed, or blended
with one another, or connected so that they form an indivisible criminal
transaction, and a complete account of any one of them can not be given
without showing the others.. ." -- then the uncharged crimes evidence was
admissible. No single trope or form of words (other than the unhelpful res
gestae) was used to state the test for admissibility. The general idea,
however, was, as stated by Underhill: the demised other-crimes evidence
must be "indivisible" from the evidence of the charged crimes, such that the
tale of the charged offenses could not be told without relating the evidence
of the uncharged offenses.9 Courts allowed evidence of an uncharged crime
only if it was "part and parcel of the same transaction" as the charged crime,
6. Id.; see also 1 CROOM-JOHNSON & BRIDGMAN, TAYLOR ON EVIDENCE § 326, at
228 (1931):
This rule ... is founded on common sense and common justice... for, as one
of the chief objects of an indictment is to afford distinct information to the
prisoner of the specific charge which is about to be brought against him, the
admission of any evidence of facts unconnected with that charge, would be
clearly open to the serious objection of taking the prisoner by surprise. No
man should be bound at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to
answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life. Few even of the
best of men would choose to submit to such an ordeal.
Id.
7. UNDERHILL, supra note 5, § 87, at 107.
8. Id. § 88, at 108-09 (emphasis added).
9. Idl
[Vol. 25:279
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or "so directly and immediately connected with the crime for which the
[defendant] was on trial '1° that it was "impossible to give a complete or
intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the otherc ,,n.' II
crime."
When a collateral offense, or, as it is sometimes called, an
extraneous crime, forms part of the res gestae, evidence of it is not
excluded by the fact that it is extraneous. As an isolated or
disconnected fact, it is not relevant.., but when offered under the
exceptions to the rule, it becomes of substance with the charge on
trial. 
2
"Evidence may be given, not only of the act charged itself, but of other acts
so closely connected therewith, as to form part of one chain of facts which
could not be excluded without rendering the evidence unintelligible-part in
fact of the res gestae."13 Lord Ellenborough stated the rule as follows: "If
several and distinct offences [sic] blend themselves with one another, the
detail of the party's whole conduct must be pursued. 14 Wigmore limited
such evidence to "other criminal acts which are an inseparable part of the
whole deed."' 5 He explained:
Suppose that A is charged with stealing the tools of X; the evidence
shows that a box of carpenter's tools was taken, and that in it were
the tools of Y and Z as well as of X; here we are incidentally
proving the commission of two additional crimes, because they are
necessarily interwoven with the stealing charged, and together form
one deed. The other two crimes are not offered as affecting A's
character, nor do they affect his character; because all were done, if
at all, as parts of a whole, and if we believe or disbelieve his doing
of one part, we believe or disbelieve his doing of all. The two
other crimes do not affect his character in the way forbidden by the
reasons of the character-rule.., i.e. by-way of undue prejudice, in
that we might condemn him now, though innocent of the act
charged, because we are prejudiced by his former crimes; nor by
10. Killinsv. State, 9 So.711,715 (Fla. 1891).
11. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479,489 (Fla. 1925).
12. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRMINAL ISSUES
§ 33, at 121 (Hilton, 10th ed. 1912) (footnotes omitted) (collecting cases); see also State v.
Wilson, 233 P. 259,261 (Or. 1925).
13. HAWKE, ROscOE's CRviNALEVIDENCE 101 (1928).
14. The King v. Ellis, 6 Bamewall & Cresswell 145, 147 (K.B. 1826).
15. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 218, at 271 (1904) (emphasis omitted).
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way of unfair surprise, in that he cannot be prepared to defend
himself against evidence of former misconduct of which he had no
notice. While thus, on the one hand, these concomitant crimes are
not obnoxious to the reasons of the character rule, so also they are
necessarily gone into in proving the entire deed of which the act
charged forms a part. There is therefore not only a necessity for
proving them, but no objection against proving them.' 6
Killins v. State17 and Oliver v. State18 are substantially similar to one
another. In each case, the defendant shot one person to death, and at the
same time shot at or menaced a bystander, who later testified against himl 9
Applying the common law res gestae rule, the Oliver court explained that
"[t]he shooting was done in rapid succession, and, according to the son's
version of the affair, the altercation preceding it had commenced between
him and the accused. It was thus all one and the same transaction, and the
testimony was competent. The defendant in Nickels v. State" was
charged with rape. The testimony of the victim necessarily made
incidental reference to conduct by the defendant that might have given rise
to charges of robbery or burglary:
When attacked, the victim resisted her assailant with the utmost
vigor and determination and a violent struggle between them
occurred in the bathroom of the victim's home, in which room the
actual attack was precipitated and consummated. The testimony
indicates that the victim was wearing, among other things, two
rings. During the course of the struggle, the assailant forcibly
removed one of these rings, but was unable to remove the other, a
wedding ring. The struggle continued unabated until
unconsciousness on the part of the victim intervened as her
assailant was about to consummate his carnal attack upon her.
Immediately after the accomplishment of the latter purpose and
while the victim lay upon the bathroom floor, her hands bound by a
towel, her assailant visited other parts of the house where he
procured several other articles of jewelry and personal
paraphernalia. After thus occupying himself for about ten minutes,
16. Id.
17. 9 So. 711 (Fla. 1891).
18. 20 So. 803 (Fla. 1896).
19. In Killins, the witness was the decedent's mother; in Oliver, the decedent's son.
20. Oliver, 20 So. at 804.
21. 106 So. 479 (Fla. 1925).
22. Id. at 481.
[Vol. 25:279
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he returned to the bathroom where the victim still lay, and after
speaking briefly with her there, fled the scene.23
The court quite properly concluded that testimony regarding the taking
by the defendant of the wedding ring, as well as "other articles of jewelry
and personal paraphernalia," was within the scope of the res gestae rule and
therefore admissible.
Thus the common law drew a firm line between other-crimes evidence
that was truly inextricable from evidence of crimes charged, and evidence
that was merely adminicular.24 Evidence of uncharged misconduct was
admissible only when it could not be elided from the narrative of the charged
misconduct without leaving that narrative confusing, incomplete, or
incomprehensible. Evidence of uncharged misconduct was not admissible,
however, simply because it provided the prosecution with narrative depth or
better story telling. To fall within the res gestae rule, the demised evidence
must be truly essential to the presentation of the evidence in chief. If the
evidence in chief were comprehensible and told a complete tale without the
other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes evidence would be
inadmissible, even if it rounded out the prosecution's case.
This common law res gestae rule was narrow in its scope and
infrequent in its application.25 An unremarkable caterpillar, it languished for
centuries. But when in 1979 it burst from its chrysalis, what emerged was
not a butterfly but a bird of prey named "inextricably intertwined."
IIU. SIMILAR CRIME EVIDENCE
Of course the res gestae rule was not the only provision made by the
common law for the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes. Long
before the adoption of Rule 404(b)-indeed long before the codification of
rules of evidence-the common law of Florida, as elsewhere, recognized that
evidence of uncharged crimes might be admitted for the purposes set out in
Rule 404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes: to prove "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.... ,26
23. Id.
24. I have borrowed this term from the jurisprudence of the ecclesiastical courts,
because I can find no term in our common law jurisprudence that fits my meaning so
precisely. Adminicular evidence bolsters and corroborates the principal evidence. It is
intertwined, but not inextricably so. It confirms, fortifies, and vivifies the principal evidence;
but the principal evidence is capable of being presented without it.
25. See UNDERHIL supra note 5, § 87; see also WIGMORF, supra note 15, § 218 n.1.
26. FED. R. EviD. 404(b); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (2000); see, e.g., Nickels v.
State, 106 So. 479, 489 (Fla. 1925) (admitting other-crimes evidence "to establish the identity
2000]
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Codification brought important limitations on the power and utility of
such similar crime evidence. The prosecution became bound to provide
timely notice of its intent to offer such evidence at trial.27 The defense could
demand a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was admitted, and
again as part of the court's charge to the jury.28 Courts became obliged to
engage in a balancing test under Rules 404 and 403,29 weighing probative
value against unfair prejudice, before admitting such evidence. At a time
when prosecutorial legions were clamoring for a doomsday machine with
of the person committing the crime laid in the indictment"); Ryan v. State, 92 So. 571, 573
(Fla. 1922) (admitting other-crimes evidence "as tending to show the defendant's state of
mind shortly after he had [committed the charged crime], and the intent with which the act
was done. It was admitted as tending to show a criminal intent in [committing the charged
crime], malice and premeditation."); West v. State, 28 So. 430, 432 (Fla. 1900) (allowing
evidence of other crimes to show "purpose"); Roberson v. State, 24 So. 474, 475-76 (Fla.
1898) (permitting evidence of spoliation to show guilty knowledge); Oliver v. State, 20 So.
803, 805 (Fla. 1896) (admitting evidence of uncharged crimes to "show the animus of the
defendant"); Killins v. State, 9 So. 711, 715 (Fla. 1891) (holding uncharged crimes evidence
admissible to "show the vicious intent, the animus, by which the defendant was
actuated .... ); see generally Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
27. Section 90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes requires the prosecution "no fewer
than 10 days before trial... [to] furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or
offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or
information." FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)1 (2000). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was amended in 1991 to require "reasonable notice in advance of trial ... of the
general nature of any such evidence [the prosecution] intends to introduce at trial." FED. R.
EVID. 404(b). Previously, some federal district courts had enforced a notice requirement by
custom, court order, or local rule. See, e.g., S.D. Fla. Local R. 88.10 (obliging the prosecution
to "advise the defendant of its intention to introduce during its case in chief proof of evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b)," which advice is to be given "not later than fourteen (14) days after
the arraignment").
28. Section 90.404(2)(b)2 of the Florida Statutes provides:
When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on
the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered.
After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited
purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be
convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)2 (2000).
29. Rule 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1979). Beechum, for
many years the cynosure of Rule 404(b) analysis in the Fifth and later the Eleventh Circuit,
was decided the same year the Fifth Circuit decided Aleman. See United States v. Aleman,
592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 25:279
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which to wage the war on drugs, one of their principal existing weapons,
evidence of prior similar crimes, was being stripped of much of its
firepower. Then in 1979, the Fifth Circuit authored its opinion in United
States v. Aleman.3
On January 13, 1978, D A Agent Castro arrested two individuals
32
named Vela and Ramirez for the sale of heroin. Eleven days later, DEA
Agent Reina, acting in an undercover capacity, met with Aleman to negotiate
a purchase of cocaine.33 In the course of that meeting, Aleman made
reference to the arrests of Vela and Ramirez, and indicated that he had
attempted to help Vela and Ramirez sell heroin.3 At the conclusion of the
meeting, Aleman handed Reina a sample of cocaine. 3
Aleman, Vela, and others were charged in a multi-count indictment
with crimes relating to the distribution of heroin.36 There were no charges
involving cocaine." At trial, however, Agent Reina testified to his
conversation with Aleman about cocaine, and made reference to the cocaine
sample Aleman had provided to hin.3s On appeal, Aleman assigned the
admission of this evidence as error, in that it was evidence of an uncharged
crime not properly within the scope and purpose of Rule 404(b).39 The court
of appeals, however, held that a Rule 404(b) analysis was inapplicable to
other-crimes evidence where, as here, the other-crimes evidence and the
evidence used to prove the crime charged are inextricably intertwined.
40
If by use of the trope "inextricably intertwined" the court meant to
invoke the common law res gestae rule, its statement of the law was no
doubt correct. Other-crimes evidence that is truly inextricable from, and not
merely adminicular to, the principal evidence is indeed admissible without
regard to the limitations of Rule 404(b). By way of illustrating this
principle, the Aleman court posited the case of a "person (who] breaks into a
house, murders the occupants, and steals a television set.' 41 Undoubtedly,
evidence of the unlawful taking of the TV set would be admitted at a trial in
which only the homicides were charged, just as evidence of the unlawful
taking of jewelry and other personal effects was admitted at the trial in
31. 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 883.
33. IL
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 883.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 884.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 885.
20001
9
Hirsch: "This New-Born Babe an Infant Hercules": The Doctrine of "Inextri
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
Nickels in which only the rape was charged. 42 The explanation given by the
Aleman43 court for its ruling seems to fall within the rationale of the common
law res gestae rule:
Reina's testimony would have been incomplete and confusing had
he not been able to explain how, eleven days after Ramirez and
Vela had been arrested for heroin dealing, he and Aleman came to
discuss Aleman's participation with Ramirez and Vela in the
distribution scheme. It would have detracted from the search for
truth to require that Reina attempt to testify without mentioning the
purpose of the meeting and what occurred in it.4
There were, however, troubling suggestions that the Aleman court was
departing from, or not even relying upon, the common law res gestae rule.
By way of case authority, Aleman cites not to the pre-codification cases
construing the res gestae rule, but to a single case from the Eighth Circuit:
United States v. Calvert.4'
The defendant in Calvert was charged with insurance fraud."4 At trial,
witnesses testified to other crimes or bad acts engaged in by Calvert, which
misconduct related in various ways and degrees to the crimes charged.47 The
Eighth Circuit held that this evidence was properly admitted under a variety
of rationales, none of which seem to adumbrate the Aleman court's
"inextricably intertwined" holding. The Calvert court began by discussing
the principles of the then newly enacted Rule 404(b).4 The closest that the
Calvert court gets to the notion of "inextricably intertwined" is in its
42. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479, 494 (Fla. 1925).
43. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 885.
44. Id. Whether the Aleman court applied the common law res gestae rule
appropriately or not is a question about which reasonable minds may differ. Presumably the
trial testimony of Agent Reina took something like the following form: I was conducting an
undercover investigation in cocaine trafficking; in that capacity I met with Aleman; in the
course of our meeting he made reference to the heroin trafficking operation of Ramirez and
Vela, whom I knew had been arrested eleven days previously; Aleman made certain
statements acknowledging his complicity in that heroin trafficking operation; when we parted
company, Aleman gave me a sample of cocaine to encourage me to purchase cocaine from
him.
A strict application of the res gestae rule would have obliged Reina elide to the first and
last facts, viz., that he was conducting an investigation into cocaine trafficking, and that
Aleman gave him a sample of cocaine. Query whether such a redaction would have rendered
Reina's testimony incomplete, confusing, or misleading.
45. 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975).
46. Id. at 899-900.
47. Id. at 905-06.
48. Id. at 906-07.
[Vol. 25:279
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characterization of some of the other-crimes evidence as constituting
"integral parts of the very crime for which [Calvert] was convicted."4 9 But
in the same breath the court, analogizing this misconduct to "the 'casing' of
several banks before robbing the most suitable target," held the evidence
"properly admitted as evidence of preparation and planning."
50
Calvert seems an odd choice as a foundation for the Aleman court's
"inextricably intertwined" doctrine. Perhaps by way of acknowledging the
problem, Aleman conducts a lengthy Rule 404(b) analysis, purporting to
justify the admission of the other-crimes evidence on that basis as well as on
the "inextricably intertwined" theory.51 This "either/or" jurisprudence
serves no good purpose. Their first-blush similarity notwithstanding, Rule
404(b) evidence and "inextricably intertwined" evidence in the true res
gestae sense are very different things. Evidence under Rule 404(b) is
admitted only for certain limited purposes, and the jury must be so
instructed; failure to instruct violates the prohibition against adducing
evidence simply to damn the defendant's character. But other-crimes
evidence that is truly inextricable from evidence of the charged crimes is
admitted without limitation or instruction. It may be received, irrespective
of any bearing on character, and yet not as evidential of design, motive, or
the like. Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) is subject to the "probative
versus prejudicial" balancing test of Rule 403. But other-crimes evidence
that is truly inextricable cannot, as a matter of tautology, be excluded no
matter how unfairly prejudicial it may be. "[O]ften... the 'inextricably
intertwined' evidence.., is extremely, if not ultimately, prejudicial as to the
jury's understanding of the defendant's guilt. This does not affect the
propriety of admitting such evidence.' a  If evidence is genuinely
inextricable from the evidence in chief, "the trial judge need not formally
weigh its probity [sic; probative value] against its potential prejudice, 4
because exclusion of such evidence would, by hypothesis, leave the evidence
of the charged offenses so exiguous and incomprehensible that it would be
impossible to go forward with the trial. It is these distinctions that render the
49. Calvert, 523 F.2d at 907.
50. Id. (citing Rule 404(b)). Further muddying the analysis, the court then dropped a
footnote stating that, in any event, the defendant had failed to object to this particular other-
crimes evidence at trial and therefore waived the issue of admissibility. See iUL at 907 n.12.
51. SeeAleman, 592 F.2d at 885-86.
52. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218; see also United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d
598, 605 (lth Cir. 1984) (because evidence was "inextricably intertwined" rather than
404(b), "the trial judge did not err in refusing defendants' requested instructions limiting
the.., evidence to proof of motive").
53. United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1054 (11th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 1054 n.5.
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"inextricably intertwined" doctrine the powerful prosecutorial weapon it has
become.
55
The Aleman and Calvert opinions seem to give little, if any,
consideration to these defining distinctions, treating two very different
evidentiary doctrines as if they were variations on a single theme. This sin
has been propagated by other courts seizing upon Aleman's holding. 6
The inapplicability of 404(b)-based jurisprudence to "inextricably
intertwined" evidence is apparent in a case involving evidence which is
genuinely inextricable. Consider, for example, a stripped-down version of
Nickles: A woman is assaulted on the street by a man who seeks to pull a
diamond ring off her finger. They struggle violently, and the assailant
succeeds in ripping the ring from the finger of his victim. He is apprehended
some minutes later, but the ring is not in his possession and it is not
recovered. He is charged with a single count of aggravated batteryY7 At
trial, the victim testifies, describing the injury done to her finger when the
ring was torn off. Defense counsel need not bother objecting that this
testimony constitutes evidence of the uncharged crime of strong-arm
robbery. 8  It does indeed, but the testimonial evidence of the strong-arm
55. Another conceptual distinction between 404(b)-typ evidence and res gestae
'Inextricably intertwined" evidence that sometimes seems to give courts difficulty has to do
with relevance. Rule 404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes are rules of
conditional or limited relevance. See FED. R. Evin. 404; FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2000).
Evidence admitted under these rules is typically deemed relevant for some purposes, but
irrelevant for others. By contrast, where "inextricably intertwined" evidence is concerned,
relevance is irrelevant. Thus if probens A is relevant to the proof of probandum X, and if X is
material to the issue, A is, as a general rule, admissible; if A cannot be said without also
saying B, B becomes admissible as "inextricably intertwined." And this is so whether or not B
is relevant (i.e., probative of X, or of anything else material to the issue). It would be
pointless even to consider the relevance or not of B.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting in dicta that any error resulting from introduction of putatively "inextricably
intertwined" evidence could be remedied by a jury instruction, because "the use of...
evidence by the jury under a Rule 404(b) theory or an 'inextricably intertwined' theory is not
materially different"); United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 514 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying
probative value versus unfair prejudice test to "inextricably intertwined" evidence); United
States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d
1049, 1054 n.5 (lth 1989); United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533 n.4 (lth Cir.
1986) (other-crimes evidence admitted but jury instructed that "defendants are not on trial for
any act or conduct or offense not charged in the indictment"); United States v. Richardson,
764 F.2d 1514, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying probative value versus unfair prejudice test);
United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 429 (1lth Cir. 1983); see also Consalvo v. State,
697 So. 2d 805, 813-14 (Fla. 1996) (other-crimes evidence properly admitted as "inextricably
intertwined," but held error for prosecutor to argue the evidence in closing).
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (2000).
58. See § 812.13.
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robbery is genuinely inextricable (in the common law res gestae sense) from
the evidence of the crime charged. The defense is not entitled to pretrial
notice, under section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, of the prosecution's
intent to elicit this testimony. 59 The defense is as much on notice of the
other-crimes evidence as it is of the evidence in chief. It can scarcely be
otherwise because the two classes of evidence are, by hypothesis,
inextricable. The defense is not entitled to have the jurors instructed that
they may receive the other-crimes evidence only for this or that limited
purpose. The evidence is properly considered by the jurors without
limitation or instruction in their deliberations as to the charge of aggravated
battery. The defense is not entitled to a judicial determination whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its unfair prejudice. Even if the
court were to conclude that unfair prejudice outweighed probative value,
there would be nothing the judge could do about it. Bowdlerizing the
evidence to eliminate or reduce the prejudice would leave the remaining
admissible evidence incomprehensible and therefore utterly lacking in
probative value.
Conflating the jurisprudence of the common law res gestae rule with
that of 404(b)-type evidence has no doubt been one factor contributing to the
metamorphosis of the meek, mild-mannered res gestae rule into the
plenipotent "inextricably intertwined" rule. The result is a jurisprudential
mare's nest. Did the prosecutor, whether through overwork and
inadvertence or in bad faith, fail to give pretrial notice of his other-crimes
evidence? Let him, even in midtrial, take refuge in the argument of last
resort: the other-crimes evidence is "inextricably intertwined" with the
evidence in chief.6 Is the judge uncertain whether to admit the proferred
evidence as "inextricably intertwined?" Let him compound one error with
another, admitting the evidence but instructing the jurors in typically
translucent legal argot that they are to consider the evidence only for certain
limited purposes. The burdens of Rule 404(b) are dispensed with, the
blessings, for the erring prosecutor and the wavering judge, remain.
It is unpleasant to attribute the expansion of the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine to a judicial inability to distinguish between the proper
understanding of that doctrine and Rule 404(b); or to a judicial eagerness to
enable the prosecution to avoid the procedural limitations with which Rule
404(b) is burdened. It is tempting to attribute the expansion of the
"inextricably intertwined" rule to another cause entirely: the common law
59. § 90.404.
60. "[A]t the charge conference... the district court asked whether a 404(b)
instruction was necessary. For the first time, the prosecutor put forward the position that the
[other-crimes] evidence was admissible because it was 'inextricably intertwined' with the
charges in the indictment." McLean, 138 F.3d at 1403 (emphasis added). The evidence was
admitted, and the ensuing conviction affirmed on appeal. Id.
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res gestae rule was easy of application as long as courts were concerned only
with common law crimes. A murder, rape, or robbery typically is
perpetrated in a brief period of time and by a small number of persons.
Determining whether evidence of a crime or crimes not charged is truly
inextricable and not merely adminicular is a relatively straightforward
matter. By contrast, the drug trafficking cases that have come before the
federal courts in Florida and elsewhere in the past couple of decades involve
crimes such as conspiracy that may persist over the course of months or even
years and may involve dozens of coconspirators, named and unnamed. In
such cases-so runs the argument-it is a more difficult and complicated
matter to determine whether other-crimes evidence is "inextricably
intertwined," and uncertainty should be resolved in favor of a judicial
determination of admissibility.
Tempting or not, this argument must be rejected. If a federal indictment
is so capacious in its scope that the court is hampered in its ability to make
the kinds of evidentiary determinations the law obliges the court to make,
then the law provides the remedy. Counts may be severed.61 Defendants
62
may be severed. But it is no remedy to deracinate the jurisprudence of the
common law res gestae rule. Regrettably, however, that is just what courts
proceeded to do.
IV. "INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED" METASTASIZES
The jurisprudence of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine developed
rapidly after the partition of the Eleventh Circuit from the Fifth Circuit.
3
The defendant in United States v. Costa,6 for example, was charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. The case against him consisted
principally of the testimony of "flipped" codefendants Cole and Campbell.6
Cole sold an ounce of cocaine, obtained from Campbell, to an
undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency .... The agent
pressed Cole about obtaining a kilogram of cocaine, and Cole
asked Campbell whether it could be procured. After
unsuccessfully attempting to acquire the kilogram from another
61. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 8, 14.
62. See id.
63. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision of Bonner, adopted as precedent the
decisions of the Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
64. 691F.2d 1358 (llthCir. 1982).
65. Id at 1360.
66. Id.
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source, Campbell reached Costa... and learned Costa had a
kilogram he wished to sell. After a series of negotiations, first a
sample and then the entire kilogram were delivered by Campbell to
Cole [and then] to the agent. Upon Cole's arrest she named
Campbell as her source, and he was then arrested.
Campbell cooperated with the DEA, naming Costa as his
source. 
6 7
At trial, Cole and Campbell testified to the foregoing events." In addition,
however, Campbell was permitted "to testify concerning his prior
relationship with Costa, even though his testimony showed Costa previously
had dealt in cocaine." 69 Campbell testified as to the circumstances in which
he came to know Costa as a dealer in cocaine to show why he could expect
Costa to provide him with a kilogram of cocaine.70 Citing Aleman,7 1 the
Costa court held this "prior relationship" testimony to be "inextricably
intertwined" with proof of the charged crimes.72 "Campbell's testimony
about Costa's previous dealing in cocaine was necessary because it formed
an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of the circumstances
surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.
73
The Costa court's version of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine
cannot be derived from the common law res gestae rule. Campbell testified
as to the crimes charged that he learned from Cole of the existence of a
willing buyer for a kilo of cocaine; that he shopped around for a willing
seller, ultimately locating Costa; that after the customary negotiations, Costa
delivered first a sample, then the kilo itself, to Carpbell; who in turn
delivered it to Cole, who delivered it to the DEA agent.7 4 Somewhere during
or after the foregoing narrative, the prosecutor apparently succeeded in
asking a question such as, "and what made you believe that you might obtain
a kilogram of cocaine from Costa?" Campbell apparently succeeded in
providing an answer such as, "because I had personal knowledge that on
several occasions in the past Costa had engaged in drug transactions." There
can be no serious suggestion that it was "impossible to give a complete or
intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other
crime[s]" or that Costa's former drug dealing and his involvement in the
charged crimes were "connected so that they form an indivisible criminal
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1360-61.
70. Id. at 1361.
71. United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1361.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1360-61.
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transaction, and a complete account of... [the latter] cannot be given
without showing [the former] ."75 Campbell's narrative as to the charged
offenses was complete, intelligible, and probative without his testimony as to
uncharged antecedent misconduct.
Nor can the Costa court's departure from common law precedent be
attributed to an inherent difference between common law crimes and federal
drug conspiracies. This was not a multi-defendant case involving dozens of
transactions extending over the course of many weeks. The entire case, from
the first contact between Cole and the undercover agent to the arrest of
Costa, took place during about a three week period in July of 1981.76 So far
as appears from the opinion, there were no unindicted coconspirators and the
prosecution's case in chief consisted mainly of testimony from Cole and
Campbell.
77
In defense of the admissibility of the evidence of uncharged
misconduct, the Costa court, apart from citing without comment to Aleman,
observed that "Campbell's testimony about Costa's previous dealing in
cocaine was necessary because it formed an integral and natural part of the
witness's accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which
the defendant was indicted."78 How Campbell's testimony as to Costa's
uncharged crimes was "integral" to his or any other witness's testimony as to
Costa's charged crimes is left unsaid. If by "integral and natural" the court
meant that the demised testimony gave contextual corroboration to the
evidence in chief, the court was entirely correct. But evidence which
provides such corroboration is adminicular, not inextricable. Its presence
fortifies the evidence in chief, but its absence does not cripple the evidence
in chief. No doubt the admission of such evidence lent force to the
prosecution narrative, but this, without more, does not justify its admission.
The Costa court provides no more, although its last word on the subject-
perhaps most troubling of all-is one of commendation to the trial court for
its "sensitivity to the problems arising under Rule 404(b)." 79
Costa soon proved itself no mere aberration. In a series of Eleventh
Circuit cases, "inextricably intertwined" became the talisman by which
evidence of uncharged crimes was rendered admissible.
The defendant in United States v. McCrary80 was an inmate at the
Federal Correctional Institute, in Talladega, Alabama. 81 He was charged
with bribing a corrections officer, distributing a small amount of
75. UNDERHIL, supra note 5, § 87, at 108-109.
76. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1360.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1361 (citing United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 886 (5th Cir 1996)).
79. See id.
80. 699 F.2d 1308 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 1310.
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methac alone, and two counts of introducing contraband cigarettes into the
prison. At trial, testimony was elicited from prosecution witnesses that
McCrary "dealt in marijuana and quaaludes on several other occasions
not... covered in the indictment."83 With an incantation of the shibboleth
"inextricably intertwined" and a single reference to Aleman, the court found
the other-crimes evidence to have been properly admitted.84 In United States
v. McDowell,8 the defendant xurchased two kilos of cocaine from one
Dalmau in the autumn of 1980. Unbeknownst to McDowell, Dalmau was
later arrested for unrelated misconduct and agreed to become an informer for
the DEA.87 During the summer of 1981 Dalmau (in his capacity as informer)
and McDowell began negotiating another cocaine deal, which negotiations
ended in McDowell's arrest and prosecution. 8  Evidence of the 1980
cocaine transaction was offered and received at trial.89 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed without discussion, citing Aleman and noting desultorily,
"[a]rguably evidence concerning the dealings between Dalmau and
McDowell is 'inextricably intertwined' with the crime charged. 9' Dalmau's
testimony might have been incomplete and confusing had he not been
permitted to mention the first cocaine deal."91 How Dalmau's testimony
about a drug deal in 1981 would have been rendered unintelligible, without
testimony about an unrelated drug deal in 1980, must remain a matter of
speculation. The tepid and diffident language employed in the opinion-the
demised evidence "arguably" was inextricable because its absence "might
have" left the evidence in chief incomplete-suggests a court embarrassed
by being caught in the act of affirming on insupportable theory the
conviction of an obviously guilty man.
92
82. Id. The cigarettes were contraband simply by virtue of their having been brought
into the prison without authorization from prison officials. Id.
83. ld. at 1311.
84. McCrary, 699 F.2d at 1311. Although the court provided no analysis whatsoever
on the "inextricably intertwined" issue, it did engage in "either/or jurisprudence": "[Elven if
the evidence of Mr. McCrary's numerous other illegal dealings is treated as 'other acts'
evidence [i.e., is not "inextricably intertwined"], it is admissible under" Rule 404(b). Id.
85. 705 F.2d 426 (1 th Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 427.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. McDowell, 705 F.2d at 429.
91. Id. Again, the court engaged in "either/or jurisprudence," commenting that
"[e]ven if the first transaction is treated as an extrinsic act, admission of the evidence was
proper" under Rule 404(b) "to show intent" Id. What particular intent was purportedly
demonstrated by this evidence is not set forth in the McDowell opinion; intent to be a drug
dealer, perhaps, or intent to get convicted.
92. Id.; see also United States v. Males, 715 F.2d 568 (11th Cir. 1983).
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A scant three or four years after the term was coined by the Aleman
court, "inextricably intertwined" referred to a principle that bore no
recognizable resemblance to its common law antecedents. It had become a
doctrinal juggernaut capable of battering down ancient evidentiary walls as
surely as the cacophony made by Joshua and the armies of Israel battered
down the ancient walls of Jericho.93 During the balance of the twentieth
century, evidence admitted in Eleventh Circuit drug cases as "inextricably
intertwined" fell into two general categories: evidence admitted simply
because the other crimes occurred during the same time period as the
charged crimes, and evidence admitted to show context, background, or the
motivation of witnesses.
A. The "Same Time Period" Rule
The defendants in United States v. Williford 4 were charged with
conspiracy and related "offenses involv[ing] large quantities of marijuana
flown into rural Georgia in small aircraft." 95  A prosecution informant
testified at trial that, during the time period of the conspiracy, he
orchestrated a meeting between the defendants and an undercover agent to
negotiate a sale of a kilogram of cocaine, but no sale actually occurred.96 On
appeal, the court rejected the prosecution's argument that the testimony as to
the cocaine negotiations was admissible under Rule 404(b).97 "Intent is the
only issue to which this extrinsic act is relevant .... This evidence is
insufficiently similar to establish" intent.98 Having characterized the other-
crimes evidence as "extrinsic," and thus by defimition not "inextricably
intertwined" the court then ruled that the evidence was admissible as
"inextricably intertwined," because it fell within the conspiracy period.
99
"While not all bad acts occurring within the time frame of a conspiracy are
automatically admissible, the fact that the cocaine negotiations occurred with
a witness coconspirator during the time of the conspiracy weighs heavily
toward finding the acts are intertwined." 100
93. See Joshua 6:1-20.
94. 764 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 1497.
96. Id. at 1496.
97. Id. at 1497.
98. Id.
99. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1497.
100. Id. at 1499. The court misspeaks when it says that the cocaine negotiations
"occurred with a witness coconspirator." The witness, one Hammond, had become a
prosecution informer in June of 1982. Id. at 1496. The cocaine negotiations took place
among the defendants, Hammond, and an undercover agent on August 3, 1982. Id. At that
time, Hammond had ceased to be a coconspirator, although of course he still posed as one. If
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A decade later, the court was no longer reticent to state frankly that all
bad acts occurring within the time frame of a conspiracy are automatically
admissible as "inextricably intertwined." United States v. Ramsdale'°I
involved a conspiracy to the manufacture of methamphetamine.1' Most of
the evidence in the case concerned the purchase in Florida and transportation
to Oregon by bus of phenylactic acid, a chemical necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine.1 3  The trial court also allowed the testimony of a
uniform patrol officer, Chantal Marie Thomas.1°4 Officer Thomas knew
nothing of the charged conspiracy and had nothing to say about phenylactic
acid.10 Her entire testimony was that on September 21, 1991, a date within
the conspiracy time period, she stopped co-defendant Charles
Christoferson's car for a defective rear license, and incidental to the stop
conducted a search in which she found Christoferson to be in possession of
3.05 grams of methamphetamine, $7801 in cash, a shotgun and a .9
millimeter pistol.1°6 Observing that "Christoferson's vehicle stop occurred
during the time of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment,"'0 7 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[e]vidence of possession of the drug which
Christoferson was accused of conspiring to manufacture, during the period
of time alleged in the indictment, and under circumstances... suggest[ing]
drug trafficking, is not extrinsic" and is admissible as "inextricably
intertwined."10 8
In neither Williford nor Ramsdale is there any attempt to preserve a
vestige of the common law res gestae rule. The informer in Williford
testified at length to the particulars of, and his involvement in, the marijuana
smuggling conspiracy. The single and discrete act of negotiating but not
consummating a cocaine transaction was thoroughly excisable from the
narrative of the marijuana conspiracy. No more was required than to instruct
Hammond's testimony as to the cocaine negotiations was admissible as "inextricably
intertwined" with the evidence of the marijuana conspiracy, it must be because all other-
crimes evidence occurring during the conspiracy time period is automatically "inextricably
intertwined," the court's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The court also found the demised evidence to be "inextricably intertwined" under the
contextlbackground/witness motivation theory. See discussion infra Part IV.B.; see also
United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984).
101. 61 F.3d 825(11th Cir. 1995).
102. Id. at 827.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 829.
105. Id.
106. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 830.
109. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1496.
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the informer to omit the matter from his testimony. Such a redaction would
have left no gaping lacunae in the story of the marijuana conspiracy. It
would not have affected that story at all. In Ramsdale, Officer Thomas was
called to the witness stand for the sole purpose of testifying to an event that
was neither pleaded as being, nor proven to be, in furtherance of the charged
conspiracy. The proposition that the testimony of one witness about
certain facts can become admissible because "inextricably intertwined" with
the testimony of other witnesses about other facts is given little if any
consideration in the common law res gestae cases.
The defendant in United States v. Jimenez"' was charged with
conspiring to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it."
2
Over what must have been an apoplectic defense objection, the trial court
received evidence that during the conspiracy period not only did Jimenez
possess marijuana and a firearm, but he also beat his live-in girlfriend." 3
In affirming, it appeared at first that the court of appeals was headed in
the direction of "inextricably intertwined." Citing Ramsdale, the court
stated the general principle that uncharged other-crimes evidence is
"admissible if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to
complete the story of the crime, or (3t inextricably intertwined with the
evidence regarding the charged offense.
The court then abandoned any attempt to demonstrate the inextricability
of the other-crimes evidence, at least as to the marijuana possession. In-
stead, it proceeded on a theory of relevance, or more particularly of "non-
irrelevance." Evidence of possession of marijuana, said the court, "is not
necessarily irrelevant to proof of methamphetamine distribution."" 5 This
sort of averment is difficult to rebut. It would be an interesting challenge to
attempt to posit some form of conduct that is necessarily irrelevant to proof
of methamphetamine distribution. On these facts, the court of appeals found
the "non-irrelevance" of the marijuana evidence to arise from taped
telephone conversations in which reference was made to "cupcakes with
white icing" and "cupcakes with green icing."'" 6  Agents testified that
"cupcakes with white icing" was drug slang for methamphetamine, and that
110. See Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829.
111. 224F.3d 1243 (llthCir. 2000).
112. Id. at 1245.
113. Hl at 1246.
114. Id. at 1249 (citing United States. v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.
1998) and Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829). What the court appears to offer as alternatives are
really appositives: evidence that arose out of the same course of conduct as the charged
crimes and is necessary to complete the story of the charged crimes is inextricably intertwined.
115. Id. at 1250.
116. Jimenez, 224 F.3d at 1250.
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"cupcakes with green icing" was drug slang for marijuana. 7 If "cupcakes
with green icing" really did mean marijuana, said the court, then it was likely
that "cupcakes with white icing" really did mean methamphetamine; if
"cupcakes with white icing" really did mean methamphetamine, then it was
likely that Jimenez was discussing the distribution of methamphetamine; and
if Jimenez was discussing the distribution of methamphetamine, then it was
likely that he was guilty of the charged crimes. 18 Thus is demonstrated the
admissibility, on the theory of "non-irrelevance," of evidence of the
uncharged marijuana crime. At the conclusion of this demonstration, the
court admitted that this "may not be the most obvious case for admissibility
of this evidence."'1 9
But even if the foregoing analysis makes a powerful case for the
admissibility of "non-irrelevant" other-crimes evidence, the fact remains that
the marijuana crimes were neither charged in the indictment nor noticed
under Rule 404(b). That being so, the marijuana evidence was inadmissible.
If the marijuana evidence was "inextricably intertwined" with the
methamphetamine evidence, then it was admissible without regard to its
relevance. But the court does not even consider whether, for example,
testimony that Jimenez possessed marijuana or discussed "green cupcakes"
could have been excised from the prosecution's case without rendering that
case confusing or unintelligible.
As to the evidence of Jimenez beating his girlfriend, the court was
obliged to acknowledge that even the "same time period" version of the
"inextricably intertwined" theory would not support admissibility. "[W]e
find it hard to believe that the government could not have successfully
redacted the abuse-related comments from [the] taped conversations."' u
That being said, however, the court determined that it need not "actually
decide whether the abuse references were inextricably intertwined with other
government evidence" because the error, if any, was harmless.1
2
'
With no conceptual or historical foundation, the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine sponsors into evidence testimony that is eminently
extricable from the evidence in chief, apparently on the theory that any bad
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. In making this remark, the court was also referring to the evidence of gun
possession. It appears that when the police burst into his home, Jimenez at first drew a gun.
lI. Prior to trial, however, Jimenez moved to suppress physical evidence on the grounds that
the police had failed to 'knock and announce." Jirinez, 224 F.3d at 1250. If Jimenez was
initially unaware that the armed men entering his house were agents of the law, his instinct to
reach for a weapon with which to protect his home and hearth was perfectly understandable-
and in any event, not evidence of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine.
120. Id.
121. Id.
20001
21
Hirsch: "This New-Born Babe an Infant Hercules": The Doctrine of "Inextri
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
thing a drug dealer does during the time period covered by a conspiracy
charge-which time period, of course, is determined by the prosecutor
offering the evidence, not the alleged drug dealer against whom it is
offered-is fair game. 22  This rule of admissibility has two things to
commend it: it is supremely easy of application, and it provides the
prosecution with an unexampled weapon with which to wage the "war on
drugs."
B. The "Context, Background, and Motivation" Rule
The "same time period" rule was not the only basis for admission of the
uncharged crime evidence in Williford. Testimony may be admitted as
"inextricably intertwined" even though "not part of the crime charged" if it
"pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up
of the crime."'123 Thus to be "inextricably intertwined," the evidence need
not pertain to the crime charged. It need not pertain to the context, motive,
and set-up (whatever these terms mean) of the crime charged.12 It need not
"explain ... the context, motive, and set-up of the crime" charged. 25 It need
not form a fixed and identifiable part of the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the crime charged. It need only "[pertain] to
the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime"
charged. Is it possible to imagine any evidence so evanescent in any given
case as not to pass this test?
The defendant in United States v. Gomez 27 was observed engaging in a
hand-to-hand drug deal and was arrested immediately. 28 A search of his
person and his car incident to the arrest revealed a loaded pistol in the glove
compartment, a mobile telephone, and a book with the phone numbers of
several persons then under investigation. 129 Also in Gomez's vade mecum
122. A charge of conspiracy pleaded as "beginning on a date unknown to the grand
jury" and ending at the time of arrest arguably embraces the defendants' entire lives. If the
prosecutor then learns in mid-trial that a defendant has done a bad thing-particularly a bad
thing involving drugs--of which the prosecutor was previously unaware, there is no
impediment to its admission. It is "inextricably intertwined" with the charged crimes. That
the grand jury was never told of it in considering the indictment, and that the defendant has
had no notice of it in preparing to meet the indictment, is no objection.
123. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1499; see also United States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2000).
124. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1499.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 927 F.2d 1530 (llth Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 1532.
129. Id. at 1532-33.
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was a listing and phone number for a man identified only as "Sammy."'130 At
trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence that, some two
months after Gomez's arrest, a Sammy Zuluago, who Rroved to be the
"Sammy" in Gomez's book, engaged in a drug transaction. "Although this
evidence concerned an event which occurred after [Gomez's] arrest, this
circuit has held that evidence inextricably intertwined with the chain of
events surrounding the crime charged is admissible." ' The evidence of
Zuluago's misconduct "was relevant to the scheme and chain of events
surrounding the charged importation conspiracy.' ' 133 How, precisely, it was
relevant is left unsaid. There is no suggestion that Gomez was involved in
the drug transaction in which Zuluago engaged at a time when Gomez was
safely behind bars. There is no suggestion that Zuluago's transaction was a
part of, or a continuation of, the drug crimes for which Gomez was
convicted. But "inextricably intertwined" evidence need not be intertwined,
inextricably or otherwise. It need only pertain, in some fashion, to the chain
of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime or crimes
charged. The Gomez evidence easily met this "test." The prosecution gives
"context" to the charged drug crimes by showing that at the time of his arrest
for those crimes, Gomez had the phone number of a man who, two months
later, would engage in an unrelated drug crime.
134
Similarly, in United States v. Herre, 35 the court allowed evidence of
the defendant's prior state court arrest for marijuana smuggling in a federal
prosecution for criminal contempt, the contempt consisting of the
defendant's failure to testify before the federal grand jury. 136 Herre had been
immunized and ordered to testify, but refused to do So. 37 To establish the
offense charged, the prosecution was obliged to prove nothing more.138 The
prior drug arrest was deemed "inextricably intertwined," because it provided
the jury "necessary background information showing why Herre had been
subpoenaed and provided the Jury with some basis to understand the reasons
behind the charged offense.""'
130. Id. at 1533.
131. Id.
132. Gomez, 927 F.3d. at 1535 (citing United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499
(llth Cir. 1985)).
133. Id.
134. IME
135. 930 F.2d 836 (11th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 837.
137. Id
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
139. Herre, 930 F.2d at 838.
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Both Gomez and Herre cite Williford's "chain of events" language.
Neither Gomez nor Herre explains what is meant by this language. 14° What
sort of chain must exist between the uncharged crimes evidence and the
charged offenses? How far may the chain extend, and how attenuated may
each succeeding link be from the charged crimes? In Gomez, the uncharged-
crime evidence consisted of proof that a person with whom Gomez
apparently had some involvement committed a crime in which Gomez
apparently had no involvement. 141 Whether this evidence would have been
admissible under traditional Rule 401/403, balancing of probative versus
unfair prejudicial value is a nice question. Fortunately for prosecutors,
"inextricably intertwined" is a means for end-running that balancing test.
The prosecution in Herre could easily have demonstrated that Herre was
duly subpoenaed; was immunized pursuant to section 6001 of Title 18 of the
United States Code; appeared before the grand jury; and refused to testify.
That the subject matter of the subpoena was drug smuggling was surely
irrelevant to the act of contumacy. Herre would have been just as much in
violation of section 401 of Title 18 of the United States Code if he had
unlawfully refused to testify about a parking meter violation. But if Herre's
trial jury had any reluctance to convict him, that reluctance was surely over-
come when the jurors learned that Herre was himself a drug smuggler. If
evidence that in all likelihood could not withstand scrutiny under Rules 401,
403, and 404(b) can avoid such scrutiny and gain admission on the bare
allegation that it relates in some fashion to a chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of charged crimes, then nothing remains of the
fundamental Anglo-American legal principle that evidence of uncharged
crimes is presumptively inadmissible.
That certainly appeared to be the case after United States v.
Fortenberry.'42 Although not a drug case, Fortenberry makes bold use of
the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine. Police suspected Fortenberry in two
murders. 43 No murder charges were ever brought, but federal authorities
prosecuted Fortenberry for, inter alia, unlawful possession of a Mossberg
500 twelve-gauge shotgun.'" Prior to trial, the prosecution notified
Fortenberry of its intent to introduce, pursuant to Rule 404(b), evidence of
Fortenberry's participation in the murders to establish his illegal possession
of the shotgun which the prosecution believed was used to commit the
murders.' 4s In its case in chief, the prosecution "presented numerouswitnesses linking Fortenberry to the double murder and the murder weapon
140. See Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1535; Herre, 930 F.2d at 837-838.
141. Id.
142. 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 719.
144. Id.
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
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itself,"14 but the shotgun was never found and therefore never produced at
trial.47
The trial court's analysis was a hedge podge of Rule 404(b) and the
"inextricably intertwined" theory. 48 The district court found the murder
evidence to be "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged
possession count subject only to Rule 403 limitations 149-- which limitations,
by definition, have no applicability to evidence truly inextricable from the
evidence of charged offenses. The district court, at the time it admitted
evidence of the murders, cautioned the jury that Fortenberry was on trial not
for murder but only for possessing firearms.'" "The district court explained
that the murder evidence was admissible solely for the jury to determine
whether it created an inference that Fortenberry possessed the shotgun in
question."151 Genuinely inextricable evidence neither requires nor invites a
cautionary instruction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.152 Evidence of the double murder was
properly admitted on the charge of possession of a firearm.153 The homicide
evidence was "inextricably intertwined" with the evidence of possession,
because it was "an essential part of the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the possession charge and was necessary to
complete the story of the crime for the jury."'54 Again, the court offers no
definition or explication of the terms "context, motive, and set-up" upon
which it relies. The closest the court gets to amplifying these terms is to say
that the other-crimes evidence "explained the context of how and why
Fortenberry acquired possession of the shotgun." 155 Whatever "context" and
"set-up" mean, they must mean a great deal. Their use enabled the
prosecution to adduce on a trial of simple5possession of a firearm otherwise
inadmissible proof of a double homicide. Because this proof was offered
as demonstrating "context, motive, and set-up," it must be inextricable;
because inextricable, it must be admissible.15  The long-standing general
rule that only evidence of charged offenses is admissible has been reduced to
an inconsequential exception (if it has any continued vitality at all) to the
146. Id.
147. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 721.
148. Id. at 720-21.
149. Id. at 721.
150. Id. at 720.
151. Id
152. Fortenbeny, 971 F.2d at 720.
153. Id at721.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 721.
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new general rule that any evidence of any bad act or crime is admissible if it
can be said in some fashion to pertain to a chain of events bearing upon the
context, motive, and set-up (terms helpfulla undefined, therefore all the more
capaciously applied) of the crime charged.
Stranger even than "context" and "set-up" is "motive." Most of the
cases in which the Eleventh Circuit employs the "inextricably intertwined"
rule are drug cases. Drug crimes are not crimes of passion; they are crimes
of financial gain. Motive is seldom an issue. The defendant sold the drugs
for money, or he bought the drugs to use and to sell for more money to buy
more drugs. Knowledge and intent may be at issue, particularly in
possession cases, but motive is clear. In United States v. Foster,15 9 a DEA
agent in Savanah, Georgia received a tip that three people would deplane
from Miami carrying cocaine.' 6 The agent observed Foster and his traveling
companions Stephanie Davis and Jeffrey Smith arrive at the airport, and
detained them there. A subsequent search of Ms. Davis revealed that she
had a kilo of cocaine secreted in her girdle. 62 Prior to Foster's trial, Davis
made a deal with the prosecution and agreed to testify. 63 She was permitted,
as part of her trial testimony, to relate that two and a half weeks prior to her
arrest with Foster, she had carried drugs at Foster's direction in the same
girdle while flying from Miami to Savannah. 64 In holding that this evidence
was properly admitted, the court of appeals seemed to speak the language of
Rule 404(b), e.g., the testimony was "relevant to Mr. Foster's opportunity,
intent, preparation, planning, and knowledge."'1 65 But the reason for the
court's ruling was that the other-crimes evidence was necessary to explain
the witness's, not the defendant's, motive.
66
Ms. Davis' explanation of the [earlier] transaction was necessary in
order for the jury to understand why Davis agreed to hide the
cocaine for Mr. Foster on the [later] trip with little or no advance
notice or apparent reflection on her part. Evidence concerning the
success of the [earlier] venture and the payment of $500.00 from
158. See also United States v. Pessefall, 27 F.3d 511 (1lth Cir. 1994) (holding other-
crimes evidence occurring eight years prior to charged crimes admissible as "inextricably
intertwined").
159. 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1050.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1051.
164. Foster, 889 F.2d at 1051.
165. Id. at 1053.
166. Id.
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Foster to Davis explains her willingness to participate in the [later]
transaction.
167
This entirely artificial rationale highlights just how false the doctrine of
"inextricably intertwined" really is. Those unwilling to pretend that the
emperor is wearing new clothes know perfectly well why the testimony
regarding the first drug deal was admitted: to show that the defendant is a
habitual drug dealer, and someone the jury should have no hesitation in
convicting. At a stretch, the evidence could be justified under Rule 404(b)
as going to negate mistake or accident, and as showing a pattern of conduct.
But to suggest that testimony regarding the earlier drug deal is somehow
"inextricable" from testimony regarding the latter drug deal, and admissible
as such, is untenable. In what sense is it "inextricable?" Clearly, Davis
could relate the events of the second drug transaction in full without so much
as a passing reference to the first transaction. The other-crime evidence bore
not at all upon any element of the actus reas. And to the extent it bore upon
the mens rea, it was alleged to bear, not upon the mens rea of the defendant,
but upon the mens rea of the witness. A witness's motive to testify may be
at issue, but Davis' motive to engage in the crime about which she was
testifying was of no relevance at all. And even if somehow it could be made
relevant, what could be plainer than the source of her motivation to act as a
drug courier? Davis did it for money. Nor is there much force to the
suggestion that the jury needed to learn why Davis acted "with little or no
advance notice or apparent reflection on her part. 168 Davis received all the
notice, and indulged all the reflection, she required when she was promised
five hundred dollars.
V. "INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED" IN STATE COURT
Given Florida's central importance as a battlefield in the "war on
drugs," and given the number of federal cases deploying the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine as a weapon in that war, the paucity of drug cases in
the state courts of Florida in which the applicability of that doctrine has been
raised is remarkable. Remarkable, too, is the constancy with which Florida
courts have resisted the temptation to distort the notion of "inextricably
intertwined" out of all proportion in order to permit the introduction of any
and all prosecution evidence.
"Inextricably intertwined" evidence did not make its first appearance in
Florida jurisprudence until 1986, in an opinion captioned Tumulty v. State.169
167. Id. at 1050.
168. Id at 1053.
169. 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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Jean Tumulty had participated in three drug smuggling ventures with the
same group of colleagues. 70 These individuals undertook a fourth such
venture in which Tumulty was not involved. 171 Although marijuana was
successfully brought into the United States, the importers were unable for
some reason to sell it. The pilot, one Marrs, refused to relinquish posses-
sion of the airplane until he was paid, thus rendering all future smuggling
business impossible.'7 Tumulty solved this problem by arranging to have
Marrs murdered.17 4 It was for the murder, and not for drug smuggling, that
Tumulty was charged. 75 The court of appeal determined that evidence of
176the drug smuggling, however, was properly admitted at trial .
It was relevant because it was "inextricably intertwined" in the
scenario of the fourth trip to show the context of the crime. It was
"inseparable crime" evidence that explains or throws light upon the
crime being prosecuted. In order to present an orderly, intelligible
case the state had to show the relationship between [the owner of
the plane] and Tumulty, close personal friends and business
associates, supplier and middleman.... The motive for the killing
was directly related to the "conversion" of [the] airplane by Marrs
and the urgent need for [Tumulty and the others] to get it back in
service. 17
In support of this proposition, the Tumulty court cites, not the common law
cases-not Killins and Oliver-but Professor Ehrhardt's treatise on Florida
evidence. Ehrhardt, in turn, cites to Aleman and progeny.
179
But there was no need to rely upon Aleman or other federal authorities.
Tumulty falls squarely within the res gestae version of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence. The defendant's motive to commit the charged
offense (as opposed to a witness's motive to testify at the trial of the
defendant for the charged offense) is inseparable from the charged offense
itself. Although a defendant's motive is often obvious, 18 it is not always
170. Id. at 151.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Tumulty, 489 So. 2d at 151.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 153.
177. Id.
178. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.16, at 206 (2000 ed.).
179. Id.
180. Willie Sutton famously observed that his motivation for robbing banks was
because that was where the money was. In Sutton's autobiography he confessed that this oft-
quoted remark was not really his own. WuILm SUTrroN & EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY
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so-as in Tumulty. In such cases, evidence of uncharged crimes to establish
motive as to charged crimes may be admissible under the res gestae rule.
[Flacts and circumstances ... will [sometimes] warrant a
presumption that the [charged offense] grew out of, and was, to
some extent, induced by... [the uncharged offense]; in which
case, such circumstances connected with the [uncharged offense] as
are calculated to show the quo animo or motive by which the
[defendant] was actuated or influenced in regard to the [charged
crime], are competent and legitimate testimony.181
And again:
When the acts form one transaction, the evidence is admis-
sible .... Where the scienter or quo animo is requisite to, and
constitutes a necessary and essential part of the crime with which
the person is charged; and proof of such guilty knowledge, or
malicious intention, is indispensable to establish his guilt in regard
to the transaction in question, testimony of such acts, conduct, or
declarations of the accused, as tend to establish such knowledge or
intent, is competent; notwithstanding they may constitute in law a
distinct crime."
Although Tumulty was undoubtedly correctly decided, it would be a
dangerous oversimplification to say that evidence of uncharged crimes is
"inextricably intertwined" whenever such evidence bears upon the
defendant's motive as to the charged crimes. The test for "inextricably
intertwined" evidence--the proper res gestae test-is whether the evidence
in chief is rendered unintelligible, confusing, or misleading without the
other-crimes evidence. If the tale of the charged crimes can be told without
including the other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes evidence is not
inextricable. Thus where the defendant's motive as to the charged crime is
readily inferred from the evidence in chief, or is otherwise not in issue, it
would be wrong to admit other-crimes evidence as "inextricably
intertwined" to establish motive.
183
WAs (1976). "I never said it. The credit belongs to some enterprising reporter who
apparently felt a need to fill out his copy... [but] [i]f anybody had asked me, I'd have
probably said it. That's what almost anybody would say.. . it couldn't be more obvious." Id.
181. FRANCiS WHARTON, I A TREATISE ON THE CRMINAL LAW 443 (6th ed. 1868)
(footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 445.
183. The tendency of the courts to blur the conceptual distinction between Rule 404(b)
evidence and "inextricably intertwined" evidence may be attributable in part to the difficulty
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Although it was possible to narrate the events of Marrs' murder without
describing the prior drug deals that led up to it-although they were
separated in terms of time, place, manner, victim, and the like-it is
probably true that the narrative of Marrs' murder would have made little
sense without the evidence of the prior drug dealings. Tumulty, after all, did
not choose Marrs out of the telephone book. Unlike the federal cases,18
here, the other-crimes evidence of "motivation" was not offered to show the
motivation of witnesses, but to show the motivation of the defendant. 185
Tumulty was decided by an intermediate appellate court. The Supreme
Court of Florida had no occasion to give consideration to the "inextricably
186intertwined" principle until it decided Griffin v. State in 1994. Griffin was
accused of a variety of serious felonies, including the theft of an automobile
which he used during burglaries.187 The car in question had been rented by
one Marshall. 188 At trial, Marshall testified:
[O]n the evening of April 23, 1990, he returned to the Miami
Beach hotel where he was staying, placed the car keys on the
dresser, and retired for the evening. When he awoke the next
morning, Mr. Marshall found that the car keys and the car were
gone. Griffin concedes that his possession of the automobile was
admissible because grand theft was a charge the jury was
considering. However, Griffin argues that the testimony relating to
the missing keys was inadmissible.., because it suggested that the
hotel room had been burglarized, and was used by the State to
show that Griffin had a propensity to burglarize motel rooms.18
9
Clearly the evidence of the taking of Marshall's keys was admissible.
Griffin was charged with theft of the car, and stealing the keys was the
means by which he stole the car. Perhaps the matter might have been
different if there were, for example, evidence that the car had been "hot
wired," or towed away, or that someone else had a second set of keys. But
on the facts reflected in the opinion, Griffin's taking of the keys was as
in handling evidence of motive. Such evidence may be admissible by the plain terms of Rule
404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
2000). Such evidence may also be admissible as "inextricably intertwined"--but only when
the test for inextricability is met.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (1lth Cir. 1989).
185. Tumulty v. State, 489 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
186. 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994).
187. Id. at 967.
188. Id. at 969.
189. Id.
[Vol. 25:279
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/8
Hirsch
inseparable from his taking of the car as was the defendant's taking of the
victim's ring and other personal items in the course of the rape prosecuted in
Nickels; as inseparable as the taking of Y's and Z's tools in connection with
the theft of X's toolbox in Wigmore's example. 190
The Supreme Court of Florida's dispositive treatment of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence is presented in the companion cases of Hartley v.
State191 and Ferrell v. State.192 Hartley and Ferrell were tried separately for
a murder and kidnapping they committed together. At Hartley's trial, a
police officer "testified that when he arrested Hartley and Ferrell for the
victim's murder, Hartley denied knowing the victim. The police officer then
testified that he told Hartley they knew he had robbed the victim two days
before the murder."193 The Supreme Court of Florida had no difficulty
concluding that the officer's testimony was improperly admitted, whether on
a theory of "inextricably intertwined" or otherwise. 1 4 The court reasoned
that "[t]he officer was not testifying to the fact that Hartley admitted robbing
the victim; the officer was merely repeating the officer's own statement that
he knew Hartley robbed the victim two days before the murder."' 195 At
Ferrell's trial, however, the court admitted "evidence that Ferrell and Hartley
robbed the victim two days before the murder." 196  This evidence was
admitted as "explain[ing] Ferrell's motivation [for the murder] in seeking to
prevent retaliation by the victim" for the prior robbery.'97
The Florida courts have hewed to the common law version of
"inextricably intertwined," admitting other-crimes evidence only when it is
truly inseparable from the actus reas of the charged crime, or from the mens
rea of the charged crime, 198 or both.199 In less than a handful of instances,
Florida courts have spoken the language of their federal counterparts,
admitting other-crimes evidence by way of a general reference to
,context. ,200
190. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218.
191. 686 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1996).
192. 686 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1996).
193. Hartley, 686 So. 2d at 1319-20.
194. Id. at 1320.
195. Id.
196. Ferrell, 686 So. 2d at 1328.
197. Id. at 1329.
198. Cf Erickson v. State, 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (actus reus)
with Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1996) (mens rea), and Pugh v. State, 518 So. 2d
424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (actus reas and mens rea); see also State v. Shaw, 730 So.
2d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist CL App. 1999); State v. Cohens, 701 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.
1997).
199. See, e.g., Pugh v. State, 518 So. 2d 424,426 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
200. See, e.g., Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 743 (Fla. 1997). In Coolen the court
found "the testimony was necessary to establish the entire context out of which the crime
20001
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In Griner v State,20 1 the defendant perpetrated two separate robberies
within two blocks and twenty-two minutes of each other.2°= Admitting
evidence of the first robbery at the trial of the second was error. The two
were not "inextricably intertwined." "The most we can say about the
relationship between these two events is that one occurred very soon after
the other, which is not sufficient to make the evidence regarding the first
incident admissible.... .203
In Porter v. State,"4 the police received a call regarding an incident of
domestic violence at the Porter residence.205 When Officer Walters arrived
on the scene, Mrs. Porter called out, "[h]e's trying to kill me."'  Walters
and another officer separated the Porters, ultimately finding it necessary to
put handcuffs and leg restraints on Mr. Porter.207  His manacles
notwithstanding, Porter continued to assault and struggle with the officers.208
He was charged with resisting an officer with violence and battery on a law
enforcement officer.? 9 The court of appeal determined that the wife's cry
for help "was not inextricably intertwined with the crimes for which Porter
was charged."'210 This was so because:
There was a clear break between the wife's statement and Porter's
altercation with the [officers]. The only relevance [of] the wife's
out-of-court statement was to explain the [officers'] presence at the
Porter residence. However, the [officers'] presence was sufficient-
ly explained by... Walter's testimony that he received a call con-
cerning a domestic violence incident. There was no need to reveal
the wife's statement .... 2 1
212The flip-side of Porter was Carrillo v. State. Carrillo was arrested for a
domestic incident with his live-in girlfriend and charged with aggravated
arose. [The] testimony was relevant and was not unduly prejudicial. Therefore, we find no
error in the admission of this testimony." Id.; see also Shively v. State, 752 So. 2d 84, 85
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Osborne v. State, 743 So. 2d 602, 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); T.S. v. State, 682 So. 2d 1202, 1202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
201. 662 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
202. Id. at 759.
203. Id.
204. 715 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
205. ld. at 1019.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Porter, 715 So. 2d at 1019.
210. Id. at 1020.
211. Id.
212. 727 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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battery.213 In the police car as he was being taken away Carrillo kicked,
struck his head against the window, cursed, and threatened, "if I'm going to
jail for this bitch, I might as well kill her."214 Rightly rejecting the argument
that this conduct was "inextricably intertwined" as bearing upon "motive" or
anything else, the court ruled that "Carrillo's threats and disruptive behavior
in the police car were so far removed in time from the incident [of domestic
violence that] they had little probative value as to his intent or state of mind
at the earlier time. Furthermore, the two incidents were not inextricably
intertwined."2 5
As the foregoing cases illustrate, most of the development of the
"inextricably intertwined" doctrine in Florida has been in non-drug cases.
But Huhn v. State216 involved a falling-out among drug dealers that led to
armed kidnapping and aggravated assault.217 Relying upon the Fourth
District's opinion in Tumulty, the prosecution offered evidence of previous
drug transactions in which the victim and the perpetrators of the
kidnapping/assault had participated together.218 The Huhn court, however,
distinguished Tumulty. In that case, the prior drug dealing provided the
motive for an otherwise inexplicable murder; the murder was simply the
consequence-in effect, the dramatic conclusion-of a falling-out during the
previous drug transactionsY In Huhn, the previous drug deals had been
consummated uneventfully, and formed no part of the crimes of kidnapping
and assault for which the defendant was charged.221
In D.M. v. State,222 the court of appeal for the Third District found
evidence to have been properly admitted as "inextricably intertwined" in a
drug case.=
During a period of fifteen minutes, a surveillance officer observed
D.M. and... A.E. standing on a sidewalk in front of a duplex. On
three occasions, someone approached the duo and handed money
to A.E. A.E. handed the money to D.M. While D.M. remained on
213. Id. at 1047.
214. Id. at 1048.
215. Id.; see also Beckett v. State, 730 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); St.
Louis v. State, 584 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. 511 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
217. Id. at 584.
218. Id. at 586-87.
219. Id. at 590.
220. Tumulty v. State, 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
221. Huhn, 511 So. 2d at 590; see also Adams v. State, 743 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Selver v. State, 568 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
222. 714 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
223. Id. at 1119.
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the sidewalk, A.E. walked to a utility room at the rear of the
duplex, returned from the utility room, and handed over a small
object to the person who had paid the money. U 4
After a fourth such transaction, one of D.M.'s customers was arrested and
found to be in possession of a cocaine rock.225 The police then arrested
D.M. and A.E. The two juveniles were charged with sale of cocaine in the
fourth transaction and-crucially for the "inextricably intertwined" issue-
possession with intent to sell a supply of packaged-for-sale cocaine rocks
found in the utility room.227 At trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the
first three sales viewed by the surveillance officer.228 Evidence of the
conduct giving rise to these sales was genuinely inseparable from the
charged possession offense.229 To prove the possession crime as against
both defendants, the prosecution:
[W]as required to show dominion and control by the [defendants]
over the drugs in the utility room. During the fifteen-minute
surveillance, the officer observed four transactions and four trips to
retrieve objects from the utility room. The evidence of the
trips... was inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the
sidewalk transactions.
230
This analysis is unimpeachable.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The law," said no less an authority than Benjamin Nathan Cardozo,
"has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was
the sovereign talisman .... ,z3' Nearly a century later, the phrase
"inextricably intertwined" has taken on the status of a sovereign talisman
which, with primitive formalism, conjures up the admission of inadmissible
evidence.
Meantime, the expression "res gestae" has been cast aside by all
courts. 232 Wigmore himself describes the phrase as:
224. Id. at 1118.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. D.M., 714 So. 2dat 1118.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1119.
230. Id. at 1119-20.
231. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
232. But cf. Lucy v. State, 340 So. 2d 840 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976).
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[U]nsatisfactory, first, because it is obscure and indefinite, and
needs further definition and translation before either its reason or
its scope can be understood; and, secondly, because its very loose-
ness and obscurity lend too many opportunities for its abuse. It is
not too much to say that it is nowadays most frequently used
merely as a cover for loose ideas and ignorance of prin-
ciples.... [T]he result is only to make rulings on evidence arbitr-
ary and chaotic, when we ignore the correct purposes of admission
and substitute an indefinite and meaningless phrase of this sort. 23
There is irony here. Having rejected, as "obscure and indefinite," as
"need[ing] further definition and translation," as a mere "cover for loose
ideas" the term res gestae, the Eleventh Circuit has simply substituted in its
place the term "inextricably intertwined"--a figure of speech as obscure and
indefinite, as much in need of definition and translation, as likely to shelter
loose ideas, as any form of words ever visited upon the law.
Such figures of speech have their purpose. If the jurisprudential goal is
a rule of law so capacious and indefinite as to provide all drug convictions
with a safe harbor on appeal, "inextricably intertwined" is ideal. If,
however, the jurisprudential goal is clarity of thought and expression, and a
due regard for the fair trial rights of accused citizens, the "inextricably
intertwined" rule as presently applied in the Eleventh Circuit is very far from
ideal.
Without reverting to the term res gestae, the courts in the Eleventh
Circuit should revert to the common law understanding of what is today
termed "inextricably intertwined" evidence. Evidence of uncharged
misconduct should be admitted only when such evidence cannot be redacted
from the narrative of the charged misconduct without leaving that narrative
confusing or incomplete. "Inextricably intertwined" evidence should be
received infrequently, as a narrow exception to the general rule against the
admission of evidence of uncharged crimes.
That the "inextricably intertwined" rule, properly defined and
understood, is a necessary part of our evidentiary jurisprudence cannot be
gainsaid. In United States v. Kerris,2Z 4 undercover agent Flagg was
investigating a stolen car ring, and in that capacity came to Florida to obtain
a stolen auto for delivery to New York.25 In his undercover role, Flagg met
Kerris.236 When Flagg told Kerris that he (Flagg) was taking two kilos of
233. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218.
234. 748 F.2d 610(llth Cir. 1984).
235. Id. at613.
236. Id.
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cocaine to New York with him, Kerris offered to supply all of Flagg's future
cocaine needs.237
Kerris then introduced Flagg to DeMeo, Kerris' partner and future
codefendant. 238 It was DeMeo who supplied Flagg with the stolen vehicle to
be transported to New York.239 At the time Flagg took delivery of the car,
DeMeo asked Flagg if he needed additional cocaine.m Flagg answered that
he did not but, should a need arise in the future, he would be in touch.21
Flagg then drove the auto to New York, telephoning Kerris several times
along the way to discuss both the delivery arrangements for the car and plans
for future cocaine transactions. 242 As a result of these discussions, cocaine
was later delivered to Flagg in New York.2 3 Finally, Flagg "had several
telephone conversations with both Kerris and DeMeo... in which Flagg
[discussed] ... pay[inw) $250,000 in exchange for five kilograms of cocaine
and two stolen cars." Kerris and DeMeo were charged with drug crimes,
but no count in the indictment expressly referenced the stolen vehicles.245 On
these facts, however, the court quite properly found the evidence of the
misconduct involving the cars to be inextricable from that of the drug
offenses.2 Flagg's testimony would have been expurgated beyond all
recognition if he had been obliged to delete references to the stolen autos.27
Compare United States v. Chilcote.24" There, an undercover agent
named Matthews had infiltrated a cocaine operation in which Chilcote was
involved.2A9 On an occasion when Chilcote and Matthews "were engaged in
weighing and analyzing the cocaine, they had a conversation in which
Matthews asked [Chilcote] whether he was a pilot. [Chilcote] replied that he
was not a pilot, but that he had once flown a DC-3 to Colombia and back."5 0
The inference, of course, was that Chilcote's unlicensed flight to Colombia
was for the purpose of a prior drug deal. Rejecting the application of the
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Kerris, 748 F.2d at 613.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Kerris, 748 F.2d at 613.
245. Ia
246. Id. at 615.
247. Id. (inexplicably citing to United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.
1979), the controlling authority for admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b)); see also
United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the doctine of res
gestae/inextricably intertwined in a non-drug case).
248. 724 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1984).
249. Id. at 1500.
250. Id. at 1501.
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"inextricably intertwined" doctrine (one of the few such instances in a drug
case in the history of the Eleventh Circuit), the court ruled that "agent
Matthews' testimony about [Chilcote's] involvement in the crime charged
would have been completely comprehensible without the testimony
regarding [Chilcote's] claimed flight to Colombia. The evidence regarding
the flight was entirely unrelated to the transaction at issue here and
constitutes extrinsic evidence...."251
Had the Chilcote court been inclined to do so, it could easily have
treated the evidence of the prior flight to Colombia as giving "context" to the
charged offense. The chain of induction from Chilcote's admission that he
had unlawfully piloted a plane to Colombia and back, to the conclusion that
he was a practiced and determined drug smuggler was no more attenuated
than the chain of induction required to link the other-crimes evidence to the
charged crimes in McDowell, 2 for example, or Herre253 or Foster.
2 54
Commendably, the Eleventh Circuit excluded the other-crimes evidence, and
did so on the correct grounds: that proof of the charged offenses "would
have been completely comprehensible without the testimony regarding
[Chilcote's] claimed flight to Colombia." 5
Thus application of the correct test for "inextricably intertwined"
evidence proves to be no more difficult than many of the other evidentiary
determinations courts routinely make in drug cases. That being conceded,
there can be no justification for admission of evidence on the "same time
period" theory or the "context, background, or witness's motivation" theory.
If proof of the charged crimes is not rendered incomprehensible, confusing,
or misleading without the other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes
evidence is not admissible as "inextricably intertwined." 6
251. Id.
252. United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426 (11 th Cir. 1983).
253. United States v. Herre, 930 F.2d 836 (1 th Cir. 1991).
254. United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1985).
255. Chilcote, 724 F.2d at 1501.
256. When the prosecution seeks to offer evidence under Rule 404(b) or section 90.404
of the Florida Statutes, it must give pretrial notice of that intent. See supra note 3. Such
pretrial notice affords the trial court an opportunity to devote mature reflection to the issue of
admissibility, and to fashion a ruling (necessarily provisional, but still providing guidance to
counsel and litigants) tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case. Such a ruling is
necessarily better considered than one made in the hurly-burly of trial. Extending this pretrial
notice requirement to evidence sought to be admitted as "inextricably intertwined" would be
similarly salutary. Courts should view putatively "inextricably intertwined" evidence with an
even more jaundiced eye than they do evidence offered under Rule 404(b) or section 90.404
of the Florida Statutes. The former is subject to redaction or limitation under the Rule 403
balancing test; the latter, by definition, cannot be elided or limited without rendering the
evidence in chief incomprehensible, misleading, or confusing.
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